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Abstract
Traditional hierarchical intrusion detection systems
have a central manager which attracts hackers to attack and
might overload when there are too many client requests. To
overcome these drawbacks, some researchers suggested to
apply Peer-to-Peer approaches in intrusion detection. Most
current Peer-to-Peer intrusion detection systems only allow
hosts to collect related information from “neighbours” (one
hop hosts). The limitation of information sources may lead
a system to make inaccurate decisions. In this paper, we
propose a Mobile Agent Based Peer-to-Peer Distributed In-
trusion Detection Framework. Agents are included in this
framework to achieve intrusion detections. In addition, a
mobile agent migration strategy is applied in the frame-
work to allow agents not only to collect information from
direct-linked “neighbours” but also other hosts in the net-
work. Benefitted from agent and Peer-to-Peer techniques,
our framework can decrease the overhead of each host in
the network, reduce the security risk, and achieve more ac-
curate detections.
1. Introduction
Security issues, such as network intrusion and virus in-
fection, are becoming more and more serious with the
growth of computer and network applications. Intrusion is
“a set of actions which attempt to compromise the confiden-
tiality, integrity or availability of a resource” [2]. In order to
prevent information from malicious attackers, Intrusion De-
tection System (IDS) is used to detect various intrusions in
network environment. Traditional IDSs [1] [3] [4] [8] [10]
normally have centralised and hierarchical architectures. In
a traditional IDS, audit records data and network monitor-
ing packets are collected from each host and analysed by a
top central analyser. Then, the central analyser makes an es-
timation on whether there is an intrusion, and decides how
to take actions against intrusions.
Traditional IDSs have two obvious drawbacks. Firstly,
the centralised and hierarchical architecture of traditional
IDSs may lead to a single point failure. Within a hierarchi-
cal architecture, the failure of the central analyser (e.g. the
central analyser is cracked by an attacker) would cause the
whole system to be destructed. Secondly, the central anal-
yser of a traditional IDS is easy to become the bottleneck of
the whole system when there are many simultaneous client
requests.
To overcome the above two limitations of traditional
IDSs, some researchers suggest to use Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
IDSs instead of hierarchical IDSs. In a P2P IDS, each host
can send detection request to other hosts of the system to
check whether there are suspicious activities, and estimate
whether the network is intruded. Without a centralised con-
troller, single point failure can be avoided in P2P IDSs ef-
fectively. However, most current P2P IDSs only allow hosts
of a system to obtain detection information from limited
sources (e.g. direct-linked neighbours). This limitation may
lead a system to make inaccurate decisions. For example,
when a multi-hosts attack occurs, current P2P IDSs may
not recognise it due to the limitation of information. Multi-
hosts attack means an attacker simultaneously tries to attack
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multiple hosts of a network, such as doorknob and network
browsing [6]. The main feature of multi-hosts attack is that
the activity level of the attacker on each host may not be
sufficiently high enough to raise an alarm to the whole net-
work. However, if a distributed intrusion detection system
can collect and analyse correlated information from multi-
ple hosts, it might recognise this attack. The motivation of
this research is to develop a distributed intrusion detection
framework by taking advantages of mobile agent technique
and P2P architecture so as to overcome some limitations of
current P2P IDSs.
In this paper, a P2P Distributed Intrusion Detection
Framework by Using Mobile Agents (MADIDF) is pro-
posed. Mobile agents are intelligent agents that can migrate
among hosts. They can execute tasks autonomously in dy-
namic environments. In MADIDF, mobile agents are used
to travel among hosts and detect intrusion of a system. A
host can send mobile agents to other hosts in the network to
gather relevant information from multiple hosts (the exact
number of hosts is dependent on the specific multi-hosts at-
tack) and recognise the aforementioned multi-hosts attacks.
In addition, P2P architecture can avoid single point failure
and decrease overhead of each host.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces some related works of this research. In
Section 3, the architecture of MADIDF is proposed and
each component in the framework is introduced in detail.
In Section 4, a novel mobile agent migration strategy is pro-
posed to allow agents traveling on the P2P network effec-
tively. Experiment and analysis are presented in Section 5.
Finally, the paper is concluded and the further research is
outlined in Section 6.
2. Related Work
In [1], a distributed intrusion detection framework based
on autonomous and mobile agents was presented. It makes
use of administrator agent to create analyser agents and send
them toward the stations to be analysed. There is a crisis
agent to create a new administrator agent if the administra-
tor falls in breakdown. In a large network, the administrator
needs to create many analyser agents and send them out.
This is a heavy burden for the administrator, and the ad-
ministrator will become the bottleneck of the whole system.
Hence, the scalability might be an issue.
DIDMA [3] is a distributed intrusion detection system
using mobile agents. It is aimed at building a distributed
IDS which places static agents at every host and the network
along with a centralised Mobile Agent Dispatcher and IDS
console. Although it has better scalability and is platform
independent, it still faces a security problem. That is if a
hacker cracks mobile agent dispatcher or IDS console, the
whole system will fail.
The Multi-agent based Intrusion Detection Architecture
[10] is a hierarchical architecture too. It consists of four
types of agents, including basic agent, coordination agent,
global coordination agent, and interface agent. If basic
agent encounters a complex task it is unable to handle, a
coordination agent is created dynamically. The coordina-
tion agent communicates with other basic agents and directs
them to perform certain functions cooperatively. When the
coordination agent encounters a complex task it is unable to
handle, it will give a report to the global coordination. In
this system, the global coordination might be a weak point
for intrusion.
In [5], a P2P intrusion detection system based on mobile
agents is introduced. This IDS gives up traditional hier-
archical architecture. Hosts in a LAN monitor each other.
They periodically send mobile agents to their neighbours
to detect intrusions. When anomalous behaviours are de-
tected, the observer neighbour initiates a voting process. It
sends a mobile agent with a voting sheet to other neighbours
of the compromised host for cooperative decision. This sys-
tem can totally avoid single point failure problem. However,
each host in the network has to store critical information of
its neighbours which is a burden for each host, and periodic
detection may result in network overload and have negative
impact on the system overall performance.
The systems proposed in [7] and [9] are the same. The
system is similar with that described in [5]. However, the
host in the network only dispatches a mobile agent to its
neighbours when a suspicious incident is observed at that
host instead of periodically sending mobile agent to its
neighbours. Although this system overcomes some draw-
backs of that proposed in [5], it still has a few limitations.
Because the host in the network only asks its neighbours
for collaborative decision, it might not detect some specific
attacks, which simultaneously attack multiple hosts in a net-
work, like doorknob and network browsing.
As introduced in the previous paragraphs, most current
IDSs have some limitations and drawbacks especially on
the aspects of single point failure and detection accuracy.
MADIDF, which is introduced in this paper, adopt a P2P
detection architecture, which can make it avoid single point
failure. Furthermore, Intrusion detections in MADIDF are
not only relied on direct-linked neighbours of a particular
host, but also other hosts in the network. In this way, the
original host can obtain more information to achieve a more
accurate decision.
3. Framework architecture
MADIDF is composed of six types of agents which are
Monitor Agent, Analysis Agent, Executive Agent, Manager
Agent, Retrieval Agent, and Result Agent. The former four
agents are static agents that inquiline on hosts, while the
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latter two are mobile agents that can travel among hosts.
Consideration of the security and flexibility of the system,
each host in the network has to be equipped with the four
static agents when they join in a network. This framework
is independent of specific network architecture. The frame-
work of MADIDF is demonstrated in Figure 1. The follow-
ing sessions describe each component of the framework in
detail.
3.1 Monitor Agent
Monitor Agent is like a host monitor which fixes at a
host. It is a main component to find intrusions in MA-
DIDF. The responsibility of Monitor Agent is collecting and
preprocessing information of both system audit records and
network traffic for further analysis, such as system file op-
eration and network connection.
3.2 Analysis Agent
Analysis Agent integrates and analyses the information
received from Monitor Agent. In MADIDF, each host in
the network has a local knowledge base which stores some
critical information, such as attack signatures, intrusion pat-
terns, system file size, and so on. If it can confirm an intru-
sion or attack, it will send a notification to Executive Agent
to quarantine damaged file or cut off network connection.
If Analysis Agent suspects that a multi-hosts attack occurs,
it will request Manager Agent for help and store the suspi-
cious activity.
3.3 Executive Agent
Executive Agent is responsible for executing tasks de-
pending on the notification of Analysis Agent. These tasks
include restoring corrupted files, preventing network con-
nection, and so on.
3.4 Manager Agent
As introduced in Subsection 3.1, the Monitor Agent of
a host is the agent that collects information from the host.
However, to detect multi-hosts attacks, it is not sufficient to
only collect information from a single host. Hence, another
three kinds of agents (i.e. Manager Agent, Retrieval Agent
and Result Agent) are included in MADIDF to collect re-
lated information from multiple hosts of a network.
The Manager Agent is the agent that manages retrieval
processes. It takes charge of Retrieval Agent and Result
Agent, including dispatching, retracting and communicat-
ing with these two agents. A Manager Agent also maintains
a Neighbour List of the host which the Manager Agent re-
sides on (see Definition 1 and Definition 2).
Definition 1: Neighbour List NLi is a list which con-
tains IP addresses of the direct-linked neighbours of host
Hi.
Definition 2: Neighbour Size NSi is an integer that rep-
resents the number of neighbours (direct-linked hosts) of
host Hi.
Obviously, the Manager Agent of a host can calculate
NSi of the host by using a function Size() as the following
Equation 1.
NSi = Size(NLi) (1)
When a host connects/disconnects with another host, the
Manager Agent of the host modifies the Neighbour List by
adding/removing related information to/from the list. In ad-
dition, each Manager Agent has a Retrieval Agent Recorder
which is used to store Retrieval Agent Identifiers (see Defi-
nition 3 and Definition 4).
Definition 3: Retrieval Agent Identifier (RAID)is used
to distinguish different Retrieval Agents. RAID is also gen-
erated by the Manager Agent. We define it as the format
“HostName0001”. “HostName” means the name of the host
which dispatches the Retrieval Agent, while “0001” means
the serial number of the Retrieval Agent, for example, the
first group of Retrieval Agents which perform the same task
is “0001”, the second group is “0002”, and so on.
Definition 4: Retrieval Agent Recorder (RAR) is used to
store Retrieval Agent Identifiers in order to avoid Retrieval
Agent traveling the hosts which it or other Retrieval Agents
with the same RAID have already visited. Each Manager
Agent has a RAR.
If a Manager Agent originates the mobile agent travel-
ing detection, this Manager Agent is called as an Initia-
tor. When an Initiator receives a request from an Analysis
Agent for deciding a multi-hosts attack, it will dispatch Re-
trieval Agents to inform other hosts to check whether they
have the similar records from the same suspicious remote
host. Then, each Manager Agent of the hosts, which have
been visited by those Retrieval Agents, will send a Result
Agent back to the Initiator. The Initiator will correlate the
information and confirm whether this suspicious activity is
a multi-hosts attack. If so, the Initiator will broadcast this
information to other hosts in the network and notify the lo-
cal Executive Agent to take actions.
3.5 Retrieval Agent
Definition 5: Time to Life (TTL), generated by an Ini-
tiator, is used to demonstrate the number of rest hosts the
Retrieval Agent needs to visit.
Retrieval Agent moves to other hosts and lets their Anal-
ysis Agents check whether there are the similar records
from the same suspicious remote host. There are four main
types of information that Retrieval Agent needs to maintain,
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Figure 1. The components in MADIDF
which are source IP address from where the original host
dispatches this Retrieval Agent, characters of the incident,
Retrieval Agent Identifier (RAID), and Time to Life (TTL).
The Retrieval Agent will be discarded when the value of
TTL reaches zero or there is no more host to be traveled.
3.6 Result Agent
Result Agent with a result record will be sent back by
each Manager Agent, which has been visited by the Re-
trieval Agent, to the Initiator. Then, the Initiator tallies all
the result records to make a final decision.
3.7 Agent working process
The working process of agents in MADIDF is described
by a sequence diagram in UML notations shown in Figure
2. In MADIDF, Monitor Agents are fixed at hosts of the
network and monitor the local activities of hosts. When
a suspicious activity happens and is detected by a Moni-
tor Agent, it collects and preprocesses relevant information,
and reports the information to Analysis Agent. The Anal-
ysis Agent analyses the information and decides whether
there is an intrusion or attack based on the local knowledge
base. If so, it informs the Executive Agent to take actions
against the intrusion or attack. However, if the Analysis
Agent suspects that a multi-hosts attack is occurring, it asks
the upper level Manager Agent for help. When the Man-
ager Agent receives a request from Analysis Agent, this
Manager Agent becomes the Initiator and then analyses the
request and dispatches Retrieval Agents to gather informa-
tion for determining whether some suspicious activities in
different hosts could be combined to form a multi-hosts at-
tack. Then those hosts, visited by Retrieval Agent, will send
Result Agents with necessary information back to the Ini-
tiator. The Initiator will make a final decision based on the
information it received. If there is a definite multi-hosts at-
tack, the Initiator will broadcast this detection result to other
hosts in the network, and inform the local Executive Agent
to take actions.
4. Mobile agent migration strategy in MA-
DIDF
In order to collect information from multiple hosts, a
good migration strategy is essential. In this section, a novel
mobile agent migration strategy for the Retrieval Agent in
MADIDF is proposed and introduced in detail. This migra-
tion strategy can let Retrieval Agent visit not only its neigh-
bour hosts but more hosts in the network to collect relevant
information.
The retrieval migration strategy includes two parts, Re-
trieval Agent generation and Retrieval Agent dispatch.
These two parts are described in detail in subsections IV-
A and IV-B, respectively.
4.1 Retrieval Agent generation
When the Analysis Agent suspects there might be a
multi-hosts attack, it sends a request to the Manager Agent
(Initiator) for help. Then, the Initiator analyses this request,
decides how many hosts (say N ) the Retrieval Agent should
visit which depends on the specific attack type, and creates
a RAID for Retrieval Agents. Therefore, the Initiator com-
pares the number of neighbours it has with the number of
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Figure 2. Retrieval Process
hosts the Retrieval Agent needs to visit. The comparison
results will fall into the following two cases.
Case One: If the number of neighbours is more than the
number of hosts the Retrieval Agent needs to travel, namely
NSI≥N (NSI means the number of neighbours the Initia-
tor has), the Initiator generates N Retrieval Agents with the
same RAID and TTL = 1 for all of them.
Case Two: If the number of neighbours is less than the
number of hosts the Retrieval Agent needs to travel, namely
NSI<N , the Initiator creates NSI Retrieval Agents with
the same RAID and TTL = N − NSI for all of them.
The pseudocode of Retrieval Agent generation is shown as
below.
/*NH[i][j] is the IP address of the jth neighbour of
host Hi; RAR[i][j] is the jth record on the host Hi.*/
Initialise N, NH[i][j], Size(NL[i]), and RAID;
//Case One
if (Size(NL[I])≥N)
TTL=1;
//Case Two
if (Size(NL[I])<N)
TTL=N-Size(NL[I]);
4.2 Retrieval Agent dispatch
After the Initiator decides the number of Retrieval
Agents, it will dispatch them with a strategy based on two
different ceases (refer to Subsection IV-A).
In Case One, the Initiator just randomly selects N hosts
from its NSI neighbours, and sends N Retrieval Agents to
the N hosts, respectively.
In Case two, the dispatch procedure comparing to Case
One is more complicated. First, the Initiator has to send
NSI Retrieval Agents to its NSI neighbours. Then, each
of these neighbours randomly selects a host from their
neighbours, and retransmits the Retrieval Agent to the
next host. In order to avoid Retrieval Agent repeatedly
traveling the hosts which it or other Retrieval Agents with
the same RAID has/have visited, the Manager Agent on
each host has a RAR (refer to Definition 4). If there does
not exist a same RAID in the RAR, the Manager Agent just
communicates with this Retrieval Agent, performs tasks,
minuses 1 from the Retrieval Agent’s TTL value, and
retransmits this Retrieval Agent to next host. Otherwise,
the Manager Agent will send the Retrieval Agent back
to the previous host which just dispatched the Retrieval
Agent, but does not minus the TTL value of this Retrieval
Agent. Then, the previous host chooses another neighbour
host to send this Retrieval Agent to. When the value of
TTL reaches zero or there is no more host to visit, the
process will stop. The process for retrieval agent dispatch
in Case One and Case Two is described by the following
pseudocodes.
//Case one
if (Size(NL[I])≥N)
//randomly selects N neighbours from Size(NL[I]),
//and stores their IP addresses in array temp[i]
for i=0 to N-1
RAR[temp[i]][++j]=RAID;
//Case two
if (Size(NL[I])<N)
for t=0 to Size(NL[I])-1
for j=0 to TTL-1
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//Initialise Path[i][j]
//Path[i][j] means the jth traveling host IP
//address of the ith Retrieval Agent.
Path[t][j]=0;
for t=0 to Size(NL[I])-1
RAR[NH[I][t]][++j]=RAID;
Path[t][0]=NH[I][t];
TTL=TTL-1;
int counter;
for m=0 to TTL-1
for t=0 to Size(NL[I])-1
counter=0;
for k=0 to Size(NL[Path[t][m]])-1
if (RAID is in RAR[NH[Path[t][m]][k]])
counter=counter+1;
if (counter==Size(NL[Path[t][m]]))
//There is no more host to travel
continue;
do
randomly generate x
from 0 to Size(NL[Path[t][m]])-1;
while(RAID is in RAR[NH[Path[t][m]][x]])
Path[t][m+1]=NH[Path[t][m]][x];
RAR[NH[Path[t][m]][x]][++j]=RAID;
5. Experiment
In this research, experiments that analyse detection pre-
cision, network latency, and network load of MADIDF were
conducted. In these experiments, we compared MADIDF
with the P2P IDS presented in [7] (i.e. MASHD). MASHD
is a P2P intrusion detection model. It also uses mobile
agents to detect intrusions in a network. In MASHD, when
a corruptive event happens on a host, the host will dispatch a
mobile agent to its direct-linked neighbours and request as-
sistances from neighbours to make a collaborative decision.
The main drawback of MASHD is that it does not have an
efficient migration strategy for agent travelling and only al-
lows agents to travel on direct-linked neighbours of a host.
This might lead to inaccurate decisions.
5.1 Experiment description
In order to test the general performance of MASHD and
MADIDF, the experiment is performed in four different net-
work scales which include ten hosts, twenty hosts, fifty
hosts, and one hundred hosts. The topology of network is
generated randomly, and the host which suspects a multi-
hosts attack occurring and other hosts which are attacked
by the multi-hosts attack are also randomly selected from
all hosts in the network. Some terms, which will be used in
the experiment, are defined as follows:
Detection Precision: the ratio of detected attack inci-
dents to all attack incidents. In this paper, we only focus on
multi-hosts attack.
Network Latency: the range from the time that attack
happens to the time that all hosts take actions.
Network Load: the overhead of total communications
and agent migration during detection process.
In most situations, detection precision is always the most
important aspect for IDSs. Network latency and load are
also significant for IDS. Low latency means IDS can take
actions against an intrusion as early as possible, and low
load can save network resources and improve performance
of IDS.
Suppose there is a scenario: a specific host suspects a
multi-hosts attack. In MASHD, this specific host sends a
mobile agent to traverse its neighbours, then the neighbours
dispatch Result Agents to the specific host, finally, the spe-
cific host dispatches a Response Agent to all hosts in the
network; in MADIDF, this specific host dispatches mobile
agents to some hosts (not only neighbours), then these hosts
send Result Agents back to the specific host, finally, the spe-
cific host broadcasts attack information to all hosts in the
network.
In order to achieve precise result, the experiment is ex-
ecuted one hundred times in all of the above four different
network scales, and every time the network topology and
attacked hosts are re-generated randomly.
5.2 Experiment result and analysis
Figure 3. Detection Precision for different
number of hosts
Figure 3 shows the detection precisions of MASHD and
MADIDF. From Figure 3, it can be seen that the precision
of MADIDF is much higher than that of MASHD. This is
because that initiators in MASHD just obtain information
from its one hop neighbours, while initiators in MADIDF
obtain information not only from neighbours but from more
hosts. Therefore, hosts in MADIDF can obtain more re-
lated information from other hosts and make more accurate
decisions.
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Figure 4. Network Latency for different num-
ber of hosts
Figure 5. Network Load for different number
of hosts
The network latency and network load of MADIDF and
MASHD are compared in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respec-
tively. From these two figures, it can be seen that MADIDF
has higher network latency and network load than MASHD.
This is because initiators in MADIDF detect more hosts in
the network which will spend more time and consume more
network resources. However, it is also noticed that when the
number of hosts is less than fifty, the network latency and
network load of MADIDF and MASHD are very close.
According to the above description, it is evident that
the detection precision of MADIDF is much better than
MASHD. Although network latency and network load of
MADIDF are higher than those of MASHD, the gap is very
small, especially in medium or small scale network. There-
fore, MADIDF uses time and resource to trade higher de-
tection precisions. Since detection precision is the most im-
portant factor to evaluate whether a IDS is secure, we can
conclude that the overall performance of MADIDF is better
than MASHD.
6. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, a framework which uses agent techniques
and P2P concept to detect distributed intrusions was pro-
posed. An agent migration strategy that can enable hosts
of a network to make more efficient and accurate detec-
tions was introduced. Compared to [5], [7], and [9], MA-
DIDF can gather information not only from neighbours of
the compromised host but from more other hosts in the net-
work that can lead to more accurate final decision. The fu-
ture work of this research is to improve the performance
of MADIDF, including optimizing the number of Retrieval
Agents and avoiding duplicate detection, especially in large
scale network and test it in real applications.
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